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Abstract 
In December 2008, the federal government released its Electoral Reform 
Green Paper: Donations, Funding and Expenditure („Green Paper‟) 
proposing a variety of reforms to Australia‟s current federal election 
funding and financial disclosure systems. This article canvasses some of 
the arguments which have been raised in favour of and against two areas 
of electoral reform proposed in the Green Paper. The first is with respect 
to restrictions on private donations to political parties or candidates. The 
second deals with restrictions on spending in electoral campaigns. In so 
doing, the article considers the question of restrictions on donations to 
political parties or candidates. It secondly analyses whether corporate 
donations should be treated differently from individual donations. The 
paper thirdly considers whether foreign donations should be accepted at 
all. Fourthly the issue of whether imposing caps on electoral campaign 
spending would help to control campaign costs and inequalities between 
candidates and parties or, alternatively, restrict a candidate‟s right to 
freedom of political expression and supporters‟ rights to hear such 
expression, is discussed. Fifthly, the problems of „incumbency advantage‟ 
and whether a distinction should be drawn between limits on donations 
and limits on campaign expenditure are discussed. The paper concludes 
by considering other issues which arise in relation to the federal 
government‟s proposed restrictions on private donations and campaign 
spending under Australian electoral law. 
Introduction 
The question of the appropriateness of current electoral laws is a matter 
of strong debate. In July 2009, the head of a former corruption inquiry, 
Tony Fitzgerald publicly criticised the current and former Queensland 
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governments for having taken advantage of incumbency to relax ethical 
standards and tacitly encourage corrupt practices in Parliament and some 
sectors of the public service. Similarly, major controversy arose earlier in 
the year regarding the relationship between the Prime Minister and a car 
dealer and the question of perceived favouritism in relation to the 
implementation of government policy (although the Prime Minister was 
completely cleared of any suggestion of wrongdoing). The Queensland 
government which enacted legislation in 2008 amending Queensland‟s 
electoral laws has also recently announced further plans for reforms to 
improve government integrity and accountability in the areas of political 
donations, fundraising and campaigning.1 
 
Electoral reforms are also on the federal government‟s agenda. In 
December 2008, the government released its Electoral Reform Green 
Paper: Donations, Funding and Expenditure („Green Paper‟). The Green 
Paper signals the first part of further electoral changes proposed by the 
government and canvasses a variety of issues relating to federal election 
funding and the effectiveness of the current financial disclosure schemes. 
Many of the issues are prompted by concerns that the inappropriate 
exercise of power, wealth or influence may impede or prevent full 
democratic and equitable participation in electoral contests or hinder the 
proper operation of our political processes. 
 
Those concerns are the basis of this article, although the scope of the 
article is restricted to two areas of federal electoral reform proposed in the 
Green Paper. These areas are the restrictions on private donations to 
political parties or candidates and the restrictions on spending in electoral 
campaigns. We will consider some of the arguments in favour of and 
against reform, considering aspects such as transparency, accountability, 
corruption, equality and freedom. 
A background to electoral laws 
When they commenced in 1984, Australia‟s federal election funding 
system and financial disclosure schemes were designed to:2 
 
 assist political parties and candidates in contesting elections; 
 reduce their reliance on private funding;  
                                                        
1  Integrity and Accountability in Queensland  (2009) (Qld) 13-5. 
2  Electoral Reform Green Paper: Donations, Funding and Expenditure (‘Green Paper’)  
(2008) (Cth), 9. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/ 
consultation/elect_reform/docs/electoral_reform_green_paper.pdf> at 19 February 
2009. 
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 require the disclosure of campaign-related transactions 
(particularly donations and electoral expenditure) in the interest 
of transparency; and  
 reduce the risk of corruption. 
 
Although our electoral laws have undergone significant amendment, 3 
further electoral funding and disclosure reforms are proposed. These 
proposed changes were first enshrined in the Commonwealth Electoral 
Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Bill 2008 which 
was introduced in the Senate on 15 May 2008. On 18 June 2008, the 
Senate referred the Bill to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters („JSCEM‟) for inquiry and report.   
 
The JSCEM tabled its report on the Bill on 23 October 2008. In the 
report, a majority of the JSCEM recommended that the Senate support the 
proposed reforms relating to electoral funding, the donations disclosure 
threshold, reporting periods and the biannual framework, donation 
splitting, foreign and anonymous donations, and penalties, offences and 
compliance. A majority also recommended two changes to the Bill:  
 
 a broadening of the current definition of „electoral expenditure‟ 
to „include reasonable costs incurred for the rental of dedicated 
campaign premises, the hiring and payment of dedicated 
campaign staff, and office administration‟; and 
 an amendment of the proposals in the Bill relating to anonymous 
donations so as to allow for anonymous donations of under $50 
to be received „without a disclosure obligation being incurred by 
the donor, and without the recipient being required to forfeit the 
donation or donations to the Commonwealth‟.4 
 
In December 2008, the federal government introduced amendments to the 
Bill, partly in response to the JSCEM‟s recommended changes. The 
revised Bill, which is now the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment 
                                                        
3  See Deborah Z Cass and Sonia Burrows, „Commonwealth Regulation of Campaign 
Finance – Public Funding, Disclosure and Expenditure Limits‟ (2000) 22 Sydney Law 
Review, 477 for useful background information on federal electoral funding, disclosure 
and expenditure regulation. 
4  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Commonwealth Parliament, Advisory 
report on the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and Other 
Measures) Bill 2008 (2008) (Cth), xiii–xvii. Australian Parliament House 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/taxlawbill%202/report/fullreport.pdf> at 
18 August 2009. 
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(Political Donations and Other Measures) Bill 2009, is intended to amend 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) to:  
 
 reduce the donations disclosure threshold from $10 900 (the 
current CPI-indexed amount) to $1000 and remove CPI 
indexation; 
 prohibit foreign donations to registered political parties, 
candidates and members of Senate groups and also prevent the 
use of foreign donations for political expenditure; 
 prohibit anonymous donations above $50 to registered political 
parties, candidates and members of Senate groups and also 
prevent the use of anonymous donations above $50 for political 
expenditure; 
 permit anonymous donations of $50 or less in certain 
circumstances; 
 limit the potential for „donation splitting‟; 
 introduce a claims system for electoral funding and tie funding to 
electoral expenditure; 
 extend the range of electoral expenditure that can be claimed and 
prevent existing members of Parliament from claiming electoral 
expenditure that has been met from their parliamentary 
entitlements, allowances and benefits; 
 introduce a biannual disclosure framework in place of annual 
returns and reduce timeframes for election returns; and 
 introduce new offences and increase penalties for a range of 
existing offences. 
Some arguments for reform - Restrictions on donations 
At present, there are virtually no restrictions placed on the amount that an 
individual or organisation can donate to the electoral campaigns of 
political parties and candidates in Australia.5 Funding and disclosure laws 
regulate the private funding of electoral contests by imposing disclosure 
obligations on electoral participants, including candidates, political 
parties and the donors themselves, once the donations exceed a disclosure 
threshold amount.6 Before 2006, the disclosure threshold amount was set 
at $1500. In 2006, the federal government increased the disclosure 
                                                        
5  S 216 of the Electoral Act 2002 (Vic) provides that it is unlawful for any holder of a 
gaming or casino licence to donate more than $50 000 to a registered political party in 
each financial year. 
6  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, Political finance in Australia: A skewed and 
secret system (2006), 9. Democratic Audit of Australia <http://democratic.audit 
.anu.edu.au/papers/focussed_audits/20061121_youngthamfin.pdf> at 3 April 2009. 
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threshold for political donations from $1500 to $10 000, with this amount 
set to increase each year through indexation.7 
 
The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and 
Other Measures) Bill 2009 seeks to lower the disclosure threshold to 
$1000 (non-indexed). It also seeks to ensure that related political parties 
would be treated as one entity with regards to the disclosure threshold and 
the disclosure of donations.   
 
However, the Bill has not been passed and the current indexed threshold 
remains at $10 900. 8  Under the current financial disclosure scheme, 
individual but related entities, such as a husband and wife, or State 
branches of the same party, are regarded as separate for the purposes of 
political donation disclosures. This means that spouses or directors of a 
company can separately donate the maximum amount to each State and 
federal branch of a political party without having to disclose the 
donations. In effect, this allows each individual donor to make multiple 
donations of up to $10 900 to national, State and Territory branches of the 
same political party without triggering the disclosure requirements. 9 
Closing this loophole would allow financial disclosure requirements to 
operate in the way in which they were intended. 
 
Donations from private sources are not capped in Australia on the basis 
that they are a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of political 
expression and association. However, this approach has been criticised 
because private funding carries the risk of making its recipients 
potentially dependent on a small number of large donors and vulnerable 
to possible undue influence or corruption.10 The Green Paper indicates 
that approximately 20% of the major political parties‟ total funding 
comes from private donations and that these are primarily large 
donations, with 45% consisting of amounts of $100 000 or more.11 This is 
in contrast to countries such as Canada, whose approach is based on 
encouraging small donations from a large number of donors.12 
                                                        
7  Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 
(2006) (Cth), Schedule 2. 
8  Financial disclosure funding threshold information, Australian Electoral Commission 
<http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties_and_Representatives/public_funding/threshold.htm> 
at 6 April 2009. 
9  Senator Andrew Murray, „Accountability – Election 07‟ (2007), 1-2.  <http://www. 
andrewmurray.org.au/documents/527/2007_Election_Accountability_Launch.pdf> at 2 
April 2009. 
10  Green Paper, above n 2, 41, 57. 
11  Ibid, 41-2. 
12  Ibid, 28. 
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Some arguments for reform - Individual donations 
Private funding to political parties and candidates consists of donations 
made by corporations or other organisations, as well as those made by 
individuals. However, there is an argument that individual donations 
should be treated differently from donations by corporations and other 
groups. This is premised on the basis that individuals can claim that their 
donations to candidates or parties are a manifestation of their right to 
freedom of political expression. 
 
In the United States, the issue of an individual‟s right to donate to 
political candidates as an exercise of freedom of political expression was 
considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Buckley v Valeo. After 
deliberating, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that restricting the 
amount that any one person or group could contribute to a candidate or 
political committee entailed only a marginal restriction on the 
contributor‟s freedom of political expression. 
 
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or 
campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support 
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the 
contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.13 
 
In Australia, these freedoms are implied in the Constitution as well as 
being expressly provided in international law, with article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights („ICCPR‟) setting 
out the right to freedom of political opinion and expression.14 However, 
article 19(3) of the ICCPR notes that the exercise of the right may be 
restricted by law in certain circumstances. However the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of the 
ICCPR, has stated that „when a State party imposes certain restrictions on 
the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the 
right itself‟.15 
 
Far from prohibiting the making of donations, a cap simply restricts the 
amount which may be given for reasons of public interest, such as to 
                                                        
13  Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), 21-2. 
14  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 19 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
15  United Nations Human Rights Committee, „General Comment No. 10: Freedom of 
expression (Art. 19): 29/06/83‟, [4]. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights. <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/2bb2f14bf558182ac 
12563ed0048df17?Opendocument> at 1 April 2009. 
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prevent corruption and to preserve a level political playing field. Having 
regard to these principles, the imposition of a cap on a donor‟s private 
donations to candidates or parties is a permissible and indeed appropriate 
restriction on the donor‟s right of freedom of political expression which 
does not jeopardise the right itself.   
 
Accordingly, while individuals have the right to donate to a political 
candidate or party of their choice, limiting the amount of their donations 
is a legitimate „public interest‟ restriction permitted in accordance with 
their right to freedom of expression. As the Green Paper acknowledges, 
countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom seek 
to balance the individual‟s right to freedom of political expression and 
association against the public interest in minimising the risk of undue 
influence or corruption in their electoral systems by restricting the 
amounts that individuals and organisations can donate to parties or 
candidates. 16  These countries have clearly decided that the right to 
freedom of political expression and association is legitimately limited in 
the political context by imposing a cap on donations to parties and 
candidates. 
Some arguments for reform - Corporate and other group 
donations 
Similarly, caps should also be placed on corporate donations to political 
parties or candidates. In Australia, despite corporate or group donations 
comprising the bulk of private funding for the major political parties,17 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) does not distinguish 
between corporate and individual donations. 
 
This is in contrast with a number of other liberal democracies.  Professor 
Marian Sawer noted in 2004 that some 23 countries ban corporate 
donations outright. 18  These countries include Canada, which bans 
donations from corporations, unions, associations and other groups, and 
the United States, which bans donations from corporations, banks and 
unions. 19  The United Kingdom also has specific corporate donations 
provisions which require public companies to seek shareholder approval 
of donations and to list donations in full in their annual reports. Trade 
                                                        
16  Green Paper, above n 2, 57. 
17  Ibid 42. 
18  Marian Sawer, „Election 2004: How democratic are Australia‟s elections?‟ (2004) 
Australian Review of Public Affairs <http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2004/ 
09/sawer.html> at 1 April 2009. 
19  Green Paper, above n 2, 29, 31, 45, 57. 
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unions must seek their members‟ approval of donations to political 
candidates or parties.20 
 
Professor Sawer has described Australia‟s approach as being „at the 
laissez-faire end of this regulatory spectrum, with no bans or limitations 
on private money except for that given anonymously‟. According to her, 
this „laissez-faire attitude allows corporations to purchase political 
influence in clear contravention of principles of political equality and 
popular control of government‟.21 Certainly, this was one of the concerns 
underlying some of the Green Paper‟s proposed electoral reforms. 
 
Ultimately, the argument for capping political donations is based on 
transparency. This was, after all, the aim of introducing the financial 
disclosure scheme. 22  The exercise of undue influence by wealthy 
individuals, who may seek to use their donations to influence the election 
or parliamentary work of candidates or parties, subverts the democratic 
principles under which public representatives are elected and jeopardises 
the democratic process itself. Such risks are correspondingly greater 
where larger amounts of money are able to be donated without being 
disclosed.   
 
Although the public disclosure of donations neither eliminates the risks of 
corruption and undue influence nor redresses inequalities in the amounts 
donated to different candidates and parties, it does allow public scrutiny 
and monitoring of both donors and recipients. In 1983, when the Hon 
Kim Beazley MP gave the Second Reading Speech for the amendment 
Bill introducing the present election funding and financial disclosure 
scheme, he commented that „it is simply naive to believe that no big 
donor is ever likely to want his cut some time. [...] The whole process of 
political funding needs to be out in the open so that there can be no doubt 
in the public mind. Australians deserve to know who is giving money to 
political parties and how much‟.23 
 
Even where undue influence is not actually exercised, it is nonetheless 
important to minimise or eliminate the perception of a conflict of interest. 
                                                        
20  Ibid 30, 45. 
21  Sawer, above n 18. See also Graeme Orr, „The Currency of Democracy: Campaign 
Finance Law in Australia‟ (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 5-
6. 
22  Green Paper, above n 2, 19-20, 43. 
23  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 November 1983, 
2213 (Kim Beazley, Minister for Aviation, Special Minister of State and Minister 
Assisting the Minister for Defence). 
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The United Kingdom Ministry of Justice acknowledged in a recent White 
Paper on party finance and expenditure that „the objective of donation 
caps would be to remove any possible perception that donating to a 
political party could secure influence of some sort and to reassure the 
public of the motives of those who give to political parties‟.24 This is all 
the more important in relation to corporate donors, whose financial 
contributions and potential commensurate potential influence are likely to 
be greater than those of individual donors. As Tony Fitzgerald recently 
reminded the community, for a government, perceptions may sometimes 
be as important as the reality where potential corruption is concerned. 
 
Unfortunately, cynical, short-sighted political attitudes adopted for the 
benefit of particular politicians and their parties commonly have adverse 
consequences for the general community.  [...] Political leaders who gloss 
over corruption risk being perceived by their colleagues and the electorate 
as regarding it of little importance. Even if incorrect, that is a disastrous 
perception.25 
 
This argument is also in accordance with one of the fundamental 
objectives of the current funding and disclosure scheme as indicated by 
the parliamentary JSCEM in 2006. The objective is that „high degrees of 
transparency in donations to political parties and candidates should 
reduce the potential for undue influence and corruption in the political 
system‟.26 
Some arguments for reform - Overseas donations 
Should donations from overseas sources be treated differently from other 
private donations? The United States, Canada and the United Kingdom 
are examples of countries which have banned donations to electoral 
campaigns from foreign nationals and other overseas sources. In contrast, 
New Zealand permits overseas donations of up to NZ$1000.27 
 
In Australia, there are currently no restrictions on foreign donations to 
political candidates and parties. However, the federal government‟s 
                                                        
24  United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, Party finance and expenditure in the United 
Kingdom: The Government’s proposals (2008) 53. 
25  Tony Fitzgerald, „Introduction to the Hon Justice Arthur Chaskalson‟, 28 July 2009, 3.  
Griffith University. <http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/ 0020/156125/ 
Tony-Fitzgerald---Arthurs-introduction---Griffith-lecture-web.pdf> at 20 August 2009. 
26  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Commonwealth Parliament, Funding 
and Disclosure: Inquiry into disclosure of donations to political parties and candidates 
(2006) iii. Australian Parliament House  <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ 
em/donations/report/fullreport.pdf> at 5 April 2009. 
27  Green Paper, above n 2, 29. 
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proposed electoral amendments include measures to prohibit the receipt 
of gifts of foreign property by registered political parties, candidates and 
members of Senate groups. The Bill also includes measures to prevent 
people and associated entities from using gifts of foreign property to 
incur political expenditure. The Bill defines „foreign property‟ as „money 
standing to the credit of an account kept outside Australia‟, „other money 
(for example, cash) that is located outside Australia‟ or „property, other 
than money that is located outside Australia‟.28 In the second reading 
speech for the 2008 Bill, Senator John Faulkner stated that,  
 
There has been concern that large overseas companies may be able to exert 
influence through the making of significant and often unreported gifts and 
donations [...]. The policy intent is to ensure that the source of all funds 
that are used for political purposes are clearly identified, to enable the AEC 
to have jurisdiction over those donations, and to enable the Australian 
public to scrutinise any possible impact that such donations may have on 
political decision-making.29 
 
In its 1996 election report, the Australian Electoral Commission („AEC‟) 
noted that Australia‟s federal disclosure laws were „not adequate to 
ensure full disclosure of the true source of donations received from 
overseas‟ and that „the potential exists for political parties to channel 
donations, originating in Australia, through overseas bodies and thus 
avoid disclosure requirements‟.30 In 2001, it recommended that donations 
received from outside Australia either be prohibited, or at least forfeited 
to the Commonwealth where the true original source of the donation is 
not disclosed in a disclosure return lodged by the foreign source.31 
 
In 2004, the AEC advised the JSCEM that „Australian law generally has 
limited jurisdiction outside our shores and hence the trail of disclosure 
can be broken once it heads overseas‟. This provides „an obvious and 
easily exploitable vehicle for hiding the identity of donors through 
                                                        
28  Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Bill 
2009, Schedule 1. 
29  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 15 May 2008 (Senator John 
Faulkner). 
30  Australian Electoral Commission, Funding and Disclosure Report Following the 
Federal Election held on 2 March 1996 (1997) 13-14. Australian Electoral 
Commission 
<http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Reports_On_Federal_Electoral_Eve
nts/1996/elec96.pdf> at 5 April 2009. 
31  Australian Electoral Commission, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters Inquiry into Electoral Funding and Disclosure (2001), 
Recommendation 11.  Australian Parliament House  <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/ 
committee/em/f_d/subfifteen.pdf> at 5 April 2009. 
To Give and to Receive: The Australian Government‟s Proposed 
Electoral Finance Reforms  
192 
arrangements that narrowly observe the letter of the Australian law with a 
view to avoiding the intention of full public disclosure‟. In other words, if 
an overseas individual or corporate donor were not the original source of 
the funds, „there would be no legally enforceable trail of disclosure back 
to the true donor, nor would any penalty provisions be able to be enforced 
against persons or organisations domiciled overseas‟. The „easiest 
solution‟ to address this loophole would be to place a „blanket 
prohibition‟ on funds donated from or passed through an overseas 
entity.32 
 
The problems inherent in accepting donations of foreign property have 
also been noted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, which warned in 2003 that, 
 
The most obvious danger [to the successful operation of a democracy] 
comes from foreign funding. If a governing party depends heavily on 
financial resources provided by foreign governments or especially 
multinational corporations, their influence may undermine national 
sovereignty and the democratic principle of self-determination.33 
 
Donations from foreign nationals and offshore corporations raise different 
issues to those associated with domestic individual or group donations, 
and accordingly should be banned outright. As the AEC has explained, 
one reason for this is the practical difficulty associated with tracing and 
accounting for donations from overseas sources. The more compelling 
reason is that financial resources provided by foreign individuals or 
companies may result in the donor seeking to influence the recipient‟s 
policies or decision-making. The potential for such improper influence to 
occur, or the mere perception that it may occur, runs the risk of 
undermining our national sovereignty. This risk can be eliminated by 
banning all donations of foreign property to registered political parties 
and candidates. 
                                                        
32  Australian Electoral Commission, Inquiry into Disclosure of Donations to Political 
Parties and Candidates: Submission from the Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 
25, 27.  <http://www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/em/donations/subs/sub11.pdf> at 5 
April 2009. 
33  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance („IDEA‟), Funding of 
Political Parties and Election Campaigns (2003) 15. IDEA 
 <http://www.idea.int/publications/funding_parties/upload/full.pdf> at 8 April 2009, 
quoted in Senator Andrew Murray, „Political Parties: Donations‟ (2004). Political 
Donations WA <http://www.political-donations.org.au/Speeches/?speech_id=1357> at 
3 April 2009. 
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Some arguments for reform - Restrictions on electoral 
spending 
At present, there is no limit on the amount that can be spent during a 
federal election campaign in Australia. Although candidates‟ electoral 
expenditure was capped at the time of federation in recognition of the 
need to contain campaign costs, this cap was abolished in 1980 on the 
basis that such limits imposed a constraint on candidates‟ campaigns and 
were difficult to enforce. 
 
A campaign spending cap imposed on the amounts that may be spent by 
all candidates during an election campaign would serve a number of 
purposes, such as helping to break the nexus between money and 
politics,34 go some way towards reducing the „incumbency advantage‟ 
which is enjoyed by sitting parliamentarians and ensure that all 
candidates‟ campaigns draw on funding and resources to the extent of the 
cap, placing all candidates in a similar position to the extent possible. 
Some arguments for reform - Reducing costs of campaigning 
Political scientists Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham contend that there 
are strong arguments for placing restrictions on campaign expenditure. 
According to them, spending caps would help to control inequalities 
between candidates and between parties, prevent excessive and 
prohibitive increases in the costs of elections and limit the scope for 
undue influence and corruption. 35  The Green Paper also notes that 
capping political campaign expenditure could reduce the reliance of 
political parties and candidates on donations and other private sources of 
funding, by reducing the need for campaign funding. It could also even 
out the campaign budgets of participants.36   
 
Is there an argument that electoral spending should be considered a 
manifestation of a candidate‟s right to freedom of political expression?  
Even if this were so, this right may legitimately be limited, as has 
previously been noted. It may also be argued that it is in the public‟s 
interest to restrain excessive electoral spending and any associated 
exercise of undue power or influence. The public interest in creating a 
level playing field for all political candidates should prevail over, and 
limit, the candidate‟s individual right to spend as much money as he or 
she might wish during an election campaign on the basis of the right to 
freedom of political expression. 
                                                        
34  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, above n 6, 96. 
35  Ibid 94. 
36  Green Paper, above n 2, 63. 
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Costly campaigns for public office in the United States provide salutary 
examples of the alternative of unbridled electoral spending. As one 
federal parliamentarian noted during parliamentary debates on 16 March 
2009, „[w]e need only look at the experience of the United States to get a 
glimpse of the future in terms of the extraordinary costs of campaigning.‟  
Moreover, he continued, 
 
I fear that the prospect of corruption, bribery and undue influence will only 
increase if the campaign arms race escalates in an uncontrolled manner in 
the future. [I]n a world of uncapped campaign spending, political parties 
will look to the bottom line and we face the prospect of wealthy candidates 
effectively buying a seat in parliament in the future.37 
 
Associate Professor Graeme Orr makes the point that strongly audited 
electoral expenditure limits imposed on parties and candidates would 
„help to breed a more modest campaign culture, something which 
anecdotal evidence suggests that voters would prefer‟.38 
Some arguments for reform - Reducing the ‘Incumbency 
advantage’ 
Another strong argument for the reintroduction of a cap on campaign 
expenditure is to diminish the significant „incumbency advantage‟ 
enjoyed by sitting politicians. The incumbency advantage is the natural or 
„inbuilt‟ advantage enjoyed by any sitting member of Parliament, who is 
likely to benefit from a higher profile, greater media exposure and a 
„recognition factor‟, particularly if he or she holds a ministerial office. A 
sitting member also has staff, office resources and electoral allowances 
which, even if not used directly for campaign purposes, may be used to 
communicate the ideas and platform of the incumbent member (or the 
member‟s political party) to the electorate. This has the result of raising 
his or her profile with constituents. This natural advantage is further 
boosted if the parliamentarian is permitted to use staffing, travel, printing, 
postal and communications entitlements, which are funded by public 
moneys, during an election campaign.39 
 
During the term of the previous federal government, the incumbency 
advantage was significantly augmented over a number of years. For 
                                                        
37  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 March 2009 
(Darren Chester). 
38  Graeme Orr, above n 21, 23. 
39  Senator Andrew Murray, above n 9, 5. 
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example, in 2001, the Prime Minister introduced a cap on printing 
entitlements of $125 000 per annum. An Audit Office report produced 
that same year showed that 113 out of 147 lower house parliamentarians 
spent less than $50 000 on printing, meaning that the new cap effectively 
encouraged parliamentarians to spend up to five times more than most of 
them had normally been spending.40 
 
Moreover in 2001, the federal government increased the communications 
allowance provided to parliamentarians for the delivery of letters, 
newsletters and internet materials. The new reforms allowed 
parliamentarians to call forward up to 25% of their next year‟s 
entitlement, effectively providing them with an additional amount to fund 
postage and other communications during an election year.   
 
In 2005, the government once again changed the entitlements so that the 
communications allowance would no longer be based on the size of the 
electorate for lower house members of Parliament. Instead, it would be 
based on the number of electors in each electorate multiplied by 50 cents 
per elector. Young and Tham note that although it may sound reasonable 
to allow each parliamentarian 50 cents for each voter in his or her 
electorate, the allocation nonetheless represents a major increase. Indeed, 
former Western Australian State parliamentarian Norm Kelly has 
estimated that the communications allowance rose from approximately 
$27 500 to around $45 000. 
 
In 2006, having won control of the Senate, the government increased 
printing allowances from $125 000 to $150 000 per annum for lower 
house members of Parliament, and from 10 reams of paper per month 
(estimated at a cost of less than $1000 a year) to $20 000 a year for 
senators.41 Almost half of these entitlements could be carried over to the 
next year, effectively providing parliamentarians with a printing 
allowance of up to $217 500 to spend on their election campaigns. In 
addition, marking a significant policy shift, government ministers 
confirmed that members of Parliament could use their printing and 
postage entitlements to fund campaign-related printing such as postal 
vote applications and „how to vote‟ cards.42 
 
                                                        
40  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, above n 6, 55. 
41  Norm Kelly, „MPs‟ incumbency benefits keep growing‟, Discussion Paper 27/06 
(2006) 2. Democratic Audit of Australia  <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/ 
20060830_kellympperks.pdf> at 3 April 2009. 
42  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, above n 6, 55-7. 
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In 2006, Young and Tham compiled a detailed list setting out the value of 
key parliamentary entitlements received by members of federal 
Parliament. According to their calculations, the total quantifiable value of 
the entitlements ranges from $887 024 to $899 324 per annum for the 
average member of federal Parliament.43 By any measure, this amounts to 
a significant „incumbency advantage‟ for each parliamentarian. Orr has 
referred to the „excessive parliamentary allowances‟ and „unrestrained 
political donations‟ enjoyed by incumbent politicians as „problematic‟,44 
while Kelly has more derisively called these entitlements „slush money‟ 
which was „tilting election contests unfairly in favour of incumbent MPs, 
at the expense of democratic equality‟.45   
 
Young and Tham have also concluded that government resources in 
particular advantage incumbent governments „in ways which lead to a 
very uneven electoral playing field because all other challengers and non-
government parties are severely disadvantaged in their ability to 
communicate with voters and participate in the public debate through 
media access‟.46 
 
Certainly, the use of parliamentary entitlements to fund election 
campaigns constitutes a significant „incumbency advantage‟, providing 
public moneys which may be used to promote his or her profile and 
platform. At the same time, it requires potential entrants to obtain similar 
funds and resources in order to communicate effectively or competitively. 
 
These entitlements render the electoral campaign more difficult or 
expensive for some candidates than for others. In doing so, they 
constitute an advantage which is both anti-competitive and undemocratic. 
They also constitute an unethical use of taxpayer money. Indeed, the 
allocation of public moneys to boost political support during electoral 
campaigns may be regarded as a form of corruption, if you accept the 
definition by Rogrow and Laswell that corruption exists if there are 
„violations of common interest for special advantage‟.47   
 
                                                        
43  Ibid 58-9. 
44  Graeme Orr, „Government Advertising, Parliament and Political Equality‟ (Speech 
delivered at the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Canberra, 11 November 2005), 3. 
45  Norm Kelly, above n 41, 2. 
46  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, above n 6, 88-9. 
47  Arnold Rogrow and Harold Laswell, Power, Corruption, and Rectitude (1963) 132-
133, quoted in Scott Prasser and Geoff Cockfield, „Rolling out the regional pork barrel: 
A threat to democracy?‟, Discussion Paper 22/07 (2007) 9-10. Democratic Audit of 
Australia <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/20071220prassercockfieldpork 
barrell.pdf> at 6 April 2009. 
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In this regard, Young and Tham have considered whether in Australia, 
the major parties have created a political finance „cartel‟ by colluding 
either implicitly or explicitly „in creating and maintaining a political 
finance system that operates in their mutual interest‟. They note that „fair 
opportunity to hold public office requires that there be “fair rivalry‟.  
Specifically it requires an “equality of arms” amongst the competing 
parties‟48 and their candidates. These principles are all the more important 
when minor party or independent candidates are contesting an election, 
since such candidates are already likely to be disadvantaged by limited 
campaign budgets and other available resources. Furthermore, principles 
of „fair rivalry‟ and „equality of arms‟ are in accordance with another 
fundamental objective of the current electoral funding and disclosure 
scheme; that „a level playing field should operate between political 
parties and independent candidates‟.49 
 
On that basis, caps should apply to all campaign expenditures to restrict 
federal parliamentarians from using their publicly-funded resources or 
parliamentary allowances to contribute to their own or other party 
members‟ election campaigns. Kelly also suggests the independent 
scrutiny of government advertising before it can be released,50 while Orr 
proposes that government spending on campaign advertising be capped, 
perhaps to an annual amount, in order to avoid significant spending 
„spikes‟ during or leading up to election years.51 
Some arguments against reform - Implied freedom of 
political speech  
The implied freedom of political speech was established in Australia in a 
number of cases in the 1990s.52 The High Court declared that implicit in 
our system of representative and responsible government was a freedom 
of political speech. The doctrine was first established in 1992, when the 
federal government passed laws which had the effect of prohibiting a 
body, whether government or non-government, from advertising during 
election periods. Broadcasters were required to make free air time 
available to political parties; the amount of time allocated was determined 
by the number of representatives that party had in the previous 
Parliament. The relevant minister claimed the laws were necessary to 
                                                        
48  Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, above n 6, 5. 
49  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 26, iii. 
50  Norm Kelly, above n 41, 5. 
51  Graeme Orr, above n 44, 14. 
52  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Levy v Victoria (1997) 
189 CLR 579. 
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prevent corruption and undue influence caused by the purchase of 
advertising during election periods. A majority of the Court invalidated 
the legislation on the basis that it impermissibly interfered with the 
freedom of an individual to communicate on political matters. 
 
In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth („ACTV‟), 
Mason CJ said the Court should, 
 
scrutinize very carefully any claim that freedom of communication must 
be restricted in order to protect the integrity of the political process. 
Experience has demonstrated on so many occasions in the past that, 
although freedom of communication may have some detrimental 
consequences for society, the manifest benefits it brings to an open society 
generally outweigh the detriments. All too often attempts to restrict the 
freedom in the name of some imagined necessity have tended to stifle 
public discussion and criticism of government. The Court should be astute 
not to accept at face value claims by the legislature and the Executive that 
freedom of communication will, unless curtailed, bring about corruption 
and distortion of the political processes.53 
 
It has been clarified in later cases that the freedom is a negative one. 
Therefore, while an individual cannot seek compensation by arguing that 
their freedom has been breached, she or he may challenge laws that 
unacceptably infringe the freedom. When considering such challenges, 
the court asks two questions; 
 
a) Whether the law effectively burdens freedom of communication 
about government or political matters in terms, operation or 
effect; and 
b) Whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a 
legitimate end, the fulfilment of which is compatible with the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and 
responsible government.54 
 
If the answer to the first question is positive and the answer to the second 
question is negative, the law is invalid. The High Court has clarified that 
communication can include the non-verbal as well as the verbal55 and that 
                                                        
53  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 145. 
54  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, with a minor 
change in wording evident in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
55  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
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freedom of communication is not simply a right to speak, but a right to 
hear a range of political views.56   
 
Given these findings, it is submitted that the freedom of political 
communication is relevant to the question of the constitutionality of laws 
limiting donations or campaign expenditure. It is contended that a limit 
on the extent to which an individual can make a donation to a political 
party does burden that individual‟s freedom of communication. This is on 
the basis that his or her activity in seeking to financially support a 
particular political party (that presumably espouses the kinds of policies 
which the donor supports) is a form of communication.57 Another way in 
which the freedom would be relevant in this context would be in terms of 
limits on the ability of third parties to expend money on campaigns. Such 
a restriction would directly restrict an individual‟s ability to convey 
political ideas through media.58 
 
A further relevant question, referred to above, is whether any distinction 
should be made between donors who are individuals and donors that are 
organisations. An argument that no distinction should be made between 
the two types of donor may be premised on the basis of the nature of the 
freedom of communication. The argument is that in order for individuals 
to properly participate in their democracy, they must be able to hear a 
range of views, and that some of these views might be expressed by 
organisations. Mason CJ has expressed these sentiments by stating that, 
„individual judgment [...] on so many issues turns upon free public 
discussion in the media of the views of all interested persons, groups and 
bodies and on public participation in, and access to, that discussion‟.59 
                                                        
56  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
57  Anne Twomey in her recent paper for the Department of Premier and Cabinet of New 
South Wales acknowledges that campaign finance reforms must be considered in light 
of the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication. Anne Twomey, 
„The Reform of Political Donations, Expenditure and Funding‟ (Department of 
Premier and Cabinet of New South Wales, 2008) 1. 
58  Graeme Orr, above n 21, 24: „How much more likely will political elites be to invent 
ways of circumventing campaign expenditure limits, for example by setting up 
ostensibly independent bodies to engage in electoral advertising?  [...]  In Issacharoff 
and Karlan‟s famous metaphor, regulators face the problem of the “hydraulics” of 
campaign finance – money is fluid and tends to find its own level‟; Samuel Issacharoff 
and Pamela Karlan, „The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform‟ (1999) 77 Texas 
Law Review 1705; Daniel Lowenstein, „On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of all 
Evil is Deeply Rooted‟ (1989) 18 Hofstra Law Review 301. 
59  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 139.  
McHugh J agreed at 232 that voters had a right to convey and receive opinions.  Deane 
and Toohey JJ in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills said that freedom of political 
discussion necessarily involved the freedom to maintain and consider claims and 
opinions about political matters: (1992) 177 CLR 1, 75.  And the Court unanimously 
To Give and to Receive: The Australian Government‟s Proposed 
Electoral Finance Reforms  
200 
 
Another way of considering limits on the amount that a political party can 
spend on election campaigns is to see it as a burden on that party‟s right 
to communicate about political matters, given that most of the cost in 
running a campaign involves communication with the people (for 
example, television, radio and internet advertising, as well as mail-outs 
and newspaper coverage). It is argued that such laws would burden the 
freedom of communication, in terms of the first „Lange‟ question framed 
above.   
 
The remaining question would then be whether the law is appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with representative and 
responsible government. What legitimate ends might justify this kind of 
regulation? 
Some arguments against reform - Corruption justification 
One argument is that limits on donations are justified by the need to avoid 
corruption of the political process. Both the High Court of Australia and 
the United States Supreme Court have recognised this as a legitimate 
government interest in the context of regulating political funding. 60 
However, as with any claimed justification for legislation, these must be 
closely scrutinised and not taken at face value. 
 
Many studies which have studied links between political donations and 
voting behaviour of politicians, have found little evidence that donations 
in fact influence a politician‟s voting patterns in any material way. The 
position is summarised by Hall and Wayman neatly as follows. 
 
Despite the claims of the institutional critics and the growing public 
concern over [lobby groups] during the last decade, the scientific evidence 
that political money matters in legislative decision making is surprisingly 
weak.  Considerable research on members‟ voting decisions offers little 
support for the popular view that [lobby groups‟] money permits interests 
to buy or rent votes on matters that affect them.61 
                                                                                                                       
declared in Lange that „common convenience and welfare of Australian society are 
advanced by discussion – the giving and receiving of information – about government 
and political matters‟: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520, 571.  The United States Supreme Court in First National Bank v Bellotti (1978) 
435 US 765 dismissed arguments that the worth of speech depended on whether an 
individual or corporation was doing the talking. 
60  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Buckley 
v Valeo 424 US 1 (1976). 
61  Richard Hall and Frank Wayman, „Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the 
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees‟ (1990) 84(3) American Political 
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Many other researchers, including Chappell, 62  Grenzke, 63  Welch, 64 
Wright, 65  Lott, 66  Sorauf, 67  Moussalli 68  and Smith, 69  have similarly not 
found the evidence to support the premise that political donations lead to 
specific policy outcomes favourable to the donors. 
 
The United Kingdom Ministry of Justice in its recent White Paper is 
similarly unconvinced of the corruption argument:  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the overwhelming majority of people 
who give to political parties do so with the intention of securing improper 
influence.70 
 
In this context, this argument for electoral law reform lacks supporting 
evidence. 
Some arguments against reform - Inequality 
Others who argue for reform claim that it is needed to improve „equality‟. 
In other words, in order to create a level playing field, we should limit 
donations or total campaign expenditure. The argument is put by Blum 
that,  
 
                                                                                                                       
Science Review 797, 798; Kathleen Sullivan, „Political Money and Freedom of Speech‟ 
(1997) 30 University of California Davis Law Review 663, 679; cf Richard Briffault, 
„The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform‟ (2000) 100 Columbia Law 
Review 620. 
62  Henry Chappell, „Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous 
Probit-Tobit Model‟ (1982) 62 Review of Economics and Statistics 77. 
63  Janet Grenzke, „Shopping in the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is 
Complex‟ (1989) 33 American Journal of Political Science 1. 
64  William Welch, „Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and 
Dairy Price Supports‟ (1982) 35 Western Political Quarterly 478. 
65  John Wright, „PACs, Contributions and Roll Calls: An Organisational Perspective‟ 
(1985) 79 American Political Science Review 400. 
66  John Lott, „Empirical Evidence in the Debate on Campaign Finance Reform‟ (2001) 24 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 9. 
67  Frank Sorauf, Money in American Elections (1983) 285; Frank Sorauf, „Politics, 
Experience and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance‟ 
(1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 1348. 
68  Stephanie D. Moussalli, Campaign Finance Reform: The Case for Deregulation 
(1990). 
69  Bradley Smith, „Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform‟ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 1049; Bradley Smith, „Money Talks: 
Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign Finance‟ (1998) 86 Georgetown Law 
Journal 45. 
70  United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, above n 24, 53. 
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The libertarian conception of free speech is best seen as integral to the 
libertarian strategy of seeking a „minimal state‟ in which paternalistic and 
regulatory functions are severely limited [...]. By promoting speech 
entitlements that are coextensive with the private ownership of wealth and 
property, the libertarian approach facilitates an upward redistribution of 
political power and initiative that tends to strengthen the political base for 
reducing the regulatory and welfare programs despised by libertarian 
theorists. By contrast, the equal liberty and collective right conception is 
integral to a strategy designed to achieve ends that are in many respects the 
opposite of those that libertarians favour. By using absolutist protection to 
guarantee sufficient social space for movements to form and enter the 
established political system, the Supreme Court has enhanced the political 
initiative, and thus the political power, of groups that lack control over 
significant wealth and property. This limited redistribution of political 
power has helped to create a political base for the paternalistic, regulatory 
welfare state.71 
 
This argument might be supported by the principle of voting equality 
inherent in our democratic system. Voting equality might be equated with 
participation equality. It is said that the libertarian conception of free 
speech ignores existing inequalities in wealth, power and knowledge 
which help shape participation in the political process. 
 
However, as with the argument about corruption above, evidence is 
required to support the assertion that electoral finance reform would, in 
fact, achieve equality or greater equality than is presently the case. Even 
if it is accepted that „greater equality‟ is a laudable objective, we must 
first ask whether there is in fact existing inequality in campaign finance. 
Moreover, if we proceed on the assumption that this is a problem, we 
must further consider whether regulation of electoral finances will 
actually help to solve the perceived problem.   
 
The evidence does not support the argument of significant inequality, at 
least between the major political parties in Australia. According to the 
Australian Electoral Commission, between 2002-2003 and 2004-2005, 
the Australian Labor Party received $122 million in private donations, 
compared to the $105 million received by the Liberal Party. Between 
                                                        
71  Jeffrey Blum, „The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to 
Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending‟ (1983) 58 New York University 
Law Review 1273, 1349.  See also Orr, above n 21: „genuine democracy requires 
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1999-2000 and 2001-2002, the ALP received $99 million in private 
donations, compared with $83 million for the Liberals.72   
 
According to recent available figures, between 1984 and 1996 the ALP 
spent $40 million on campaigns, while the Liberals spent $35 million.  
The estimate of total campaign expenditure on the 2004 election was $19 
million for the ALP and $22 million for the Liberals.73 These figures do 
not support an assertion of gross inequality, at least as between 
Australia‟s major political parties and the others realistically in a position 
to form government. Therefore they do not justify regulation of campaign 
finances by the federal government. 
 
Another argument is that a candidate may be able to raise large amounts 
of cash simply by virtue of the popularity of such a candidate and their 
views. An example is the impressive fund raising ability of President 
Barack Obama from 2006 to 2008. It is difficult to argue that limiting the 
amount that could be donated to his (or any other candidate‟s) campaign 
would have made the result more „democratic‟. The very fact that he 
drew donations from such a broad cross-section of society could actually 
be suggestive of democracy at work, of people expressing their strong 
support for a candidacy by providing that candidate with resources.   
 
Other scholars have concluded that, far from creating equality, campaign 
finance restrictions actually promote inequality by making it tougher for 
new entrants to raise the necessary funding. It is argued that restrictions 
favour „repeat players‟ in the political system, those who know the rules 
and how to make them work, at the expense of new candidates. 74  
Regulation thus could lead to conservative outcomes where the status quo 
is privileged at the expense of new candidates or fresh political 
movements. 
 
Another argument against reform is that less drastic means than bans and 
caps are available to secure the legitimate objectives of such regulation. 
The Lange test calls for such consideration, with its second question 
focussing on whether the law is appropriate and adapted to fulfilling a 
                                                        
72  Green Paper, above n 2, 12. 
73  See also Joo-Cheong Tham and David Grove, „Public Funding and Expenditure 
Regulation of Australian Political Parties: Some Reflections‟ (2004) 32 Federal Law 
Review 397, 401-5. 
74  Bradley Smith, „Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform‟, above n 69, 1072-84; Bradley Smith, „Money Talks: Speech, 
Corruption, Equality and Campaign Finance‟, above n 69, 88; Joel Gora, „Campaign 
Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better Way‟ (1998) 6 Journal of Law and 
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legitimate end. An example of such reasoning appears in the unanimous 
decision of Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 
 
In ACTV, for example, a majority of this Court held that a law seriously 
impeding discussion during the course of a federal election was invalid 
because there were other less drastic means by which the objectives of the 
law could be achieved.75 
 
In the current context of campaign finance regulation, less drastic means 
include many of the existing features of finance regulation such as 
registers of political donations, requirements for full disclosure of 
donations made and the existence and enforcement of criminal penalties 
for bribery and corruption. In other words, we may not need further 
regulation in order to meet the clearly legitimate objective of having fair 
and corruption-free electoral processes. 
 
The assumption that, merely because a candidate or a political party has 
more money, he or she is guaranteed electoral success is also open to 
question.76 In one recent Australian example, very significant resources 
were devoted to the „selling‟ of the previous federal government‟s Work 
Choices policy, evidently with little success. 
Some arguments against reform - Freedom of association 
A related argument is that campaign finance regulation may effectively 
infringe on the right to freedom of association. The first question is 
whether such a right exists in Australia. Article 22 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides expressly for the right to 
freedom of association with others. The article provides that the right is 
not absolute but that any limits must be prescribed by law and must be 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. A proportionality test is envisaged.77  
                                                        
75  (1997) 189 CLR 520, 568. 
76  Bradley Smith, „Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign Finance‟, 
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While this covenant has not been enacted by the Australian Parliament, 
international law is relevant in interpreting the requirements of the 
Australian Constitution.78 
 
In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth,79 Gaudron J 
claimed that representative democracy may include freedom of 
association. McHugh J also discussed a right to associate and accepted 
that the freedom of political communication included the right of 
individuals to communicate their own arguments and opinions to other 
members of the community concerning those issues.80 Mason CJ accepted 
that the freedom included freedom of communication between all 
persons, groups and bodies in the community. 81  Although these were 
comments made in obiter dicta, it is submitted that they support an 
argument that the freedom of political communication includes the 
freedom of association. Individuals cannot communicate political ideas 
without being able to associate with others for that purpose. 
 
The broader context in which the freedom could operate was in evidence 
in the facts in Kruger v The Commonwealth.82 In this case the issues did 
not concern communication or association that might be described as 
overtly political, unlike other cases involving the implied freedom.83 In 
Kruger, Toohey J found the freedom of association was an essential 
ingredient of political communication.84 Gaudron J agreed, to the extent 
                                                        
78  Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
79  (1992) 177 CLR 106, 212. 
80  Ibid 231-2. 
81  Ibid 139.  Similarly, in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, Deane and 
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82  (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
83  In other words, it did not involve banning of political advertising (Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106); laws regarding 
defamation of a politician (Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd  (1994) 182 
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84  Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 91. 
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necessary for the maintenance of the system of government for which the 
Constitution provides, as did McHugh J.85 Gaudron J noted that, 
 
just as communication would be impossible if „each person was an island‟, 
so too it is substantially impeded if citizens are held in enclaves, no matter 
how large the enclave or congenial its composition.  Freedom of political 
communication depends on human contact and entails at least a significant 
measure of freedom to associate with others. And freedom of association 
necessarily entails freedom of movement.86 
 
In Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission,87 several members of 
the Court considered the argument in favour of a freedom of political 
association. McHugh J reiterated his belief in such a freedom.88 Kirby J 
accepted there was implied in sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution, a 
freedom of association and freedom to participate in  community debate89 
about political parties‟ policies and programmes and the substantially 
uncontrolled right of association enjoyed by electors to associate with 
political parties and communicate about such matters with other 
electors.90 Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Heydon J agreed, did not 
dismiss the freedom of association and saw it as part of the recognised 
freedom of political communication. 91  Various commentators have 
suggested that freedom of association is essential to representative 
democracy.92 
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of Parliamentary Democracy (1935) 116-117; David Held, Models of Democracy 
(1987), 67.  Similarly the United States Supreme Court found in Sweezy v New 
Hampshire 354 US 234 (1957) that free association was part of the political freedom 
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The authors accept the existence of such a freedom remains contentious. 
However, if and when the High Court eventually accepts that such a 
freedom exists, it could be relevant to a consideration of the constitutional 
validity of proposed reforms to electoral financing. Specifically, the 
argument would be that by restricting an individual‟s ability to donate to 
a particular political party, the limit is likely to have the effect of 
implicitly limiting the likelihood of an individual associating with others 
in terms of political parties. 
Should a distinction be made between donations and 
campaign expenditure? 
The Green Paper considers the question of limits on donations separately 
from questions of limits on actual campaign expenditure.93 The American 
cases, including the leading case of Buckley v Valeo,94 draw a distinction 
between the two types of regulation, allowing limits to be imposed on one 
but not the other.95 One argument against such differential treatment is 
that the candidate is effectively the medium through which the political 
views of the donor are communicated. The donor can speak directly to 
the people, or indirectly through a candidate. In Buckley, the Supreme 
Court recognised a distinction between, on the one hand, limits on 
donations and on the other, caps on spending, in these terms: 
 
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditure for political expression, a 
limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to 
a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon 
the contributor‟s ability to engage free communication. A contribution 
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, 
but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. [A] 
limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or 
campaign organisation thus involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support 
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the 
contributor‟s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While 
                                                                                                                       
upon which democracy was based:.  It has been noted that advocacy is improved by 
group association: National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People v 
Alabama 357 US 449 (1958), 460. 
93  Chapter 7 is about bans or caps on private funding. Chapter 8 concerns caps on 
expenditure. 
94 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
95  This distinction continues to be made: see, for example, Randall v Sorrell 126 S Ct 
2479 (2006); Federal Election Commission v Wisconsin Right to Life Inc 127 S Ct 
2652 (2007). 
To Give and to Receive: The Australian Government‟s Proposed 
Electoral Finance Reforms  
208 
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or 
an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of 
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than 
the contributor.96 
 
By contrast, it might be argued that both are forms of political speech, 
and should be entitled to equal protection. In the broader view of things, 
surely the consequences of allowing limits on donations will, all other 
matters being equal, effectively limit total spending.97 As Burger CJ in 
dissent observed in the Buckley case, donations made are intended to be 
expended, and are expended, by the candidate in communicating a 
political view. This view is one with which the authors agree. It is 
difficult to justify making the distinction between the two as sharply as 
the Court expressed it in Buckley, since surely the effect of limiting 
donations will, sooner or later, end up curbing the total expenditure, 
exactly the type of measure the Supreme Court would not accept in 
Buckley. Arguably, a sharp distinction should not be made between the 
two. 
Conclusion 
At this stage, the scope of the government‟s proposed federal electoral 
reforms is unknown. The first Green Paper was an initial step towards 
donation, funding and expenditure reforms, while a second Green Paper 
proposing ideas and options to strengthen federal electoral processes was 
released on 23 September 2009. The federal government called for public 
submissions in response to the first Green Paper and much may depend 
on the nature of that response and the content of the submissions.   
 
Furthermore, the passage of the revised Commonwealth Electoral 
Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Bill 2009 may be 
a long time coming. The Bill was introduced to the House of 
Representatives on 12 March 2009, where it was passed on 16 March 
2009. It was introduced to the Senate on 17 March 2009, but its second 
reading was adjourned on the same day and the Bill has not progressed 
since then.98 
                                                        
96  Buckley v Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
97  It may increase third party expenditure, unless that is also proscribed or is included 
within the limit. 
98  See the background to the Bill in Nicholas Horne, Parliamentary Library, „Bills Digest 
No 115 2008-09 in relation to the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political 
Donations and Other Measures) Bill 2009‟, 18 March 2009, 3-4.  Australian 
Parliament House <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2008-09/09bd115.htm> at 
8 April 2009. 
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Even if it is passed, the question of whether it will address the problems 
with federal electoral funding and campaign finance schemes which have 
been considered in this article is difficult to answer. As Deborah Cass and 
Sonia Burrows have noted, campaign finance regulation in Australia over 
the past 100 years has been a case of „catch-up politics‟, with new 
loopholes opening as soon as others are closed.99 Indeed, according to the 
AEC, a comprehensive review of federal electoral legislation and the 
principles underpinning the legislation may be required.100 
 
Clearly, it is still „early days‟ for the federal government‟s proposed 
electoral reforms. Nonetheless, the proposed reforms raise issues which 
are important and relevant to all jurisdictions. These issues, together with 
any questions they raise, deserve to be carefully and thoroughly 
addressed.  It is for this reason that this article has considered a number of 
the issues and arguments that are likely to be raised in the public debate 
over electoral reforms and has reached some conclusions. It is our view 
that the government should be prepared to consider some restrictions in 
the areas of private donations and electoral spending. However, in a 
liberal democracy such as Australia, where an individual‟s right to 
freedom of expression is valued and safeguarded, any restrictions which 
are eventually imposed must be the result of careful consideration and 
capable of full justification. 
                                                        
99  Deborah Z Cass and Sonia Burrows, above n 3, 523. 
100  Australian Electoral Commission, above n 32, [1.4]. 
  
 
